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Abstract The cryptosystem based on the Learning-with-Errors (LWE) problem is
considered as a post-quantum cryptosystem, because it is not based on the factoring
problem with large primes which is easily solved by a quantum computer. Moreover,
the LWE-based cryptosystem allows fully homomorphic arithmetics so that two
encrypted variables can be added and multiplied without decrypting them. This
chapter provides a comprehensive introduction to the LWE-based cryptosystem with
examples. A key to the security of the LWE-based cryptosystem is the injection
of random errors in the ciphertexts, which however hinders unlimited recursive
operation of homomorphic arithmetics on ciphertexts due to the growth of the error.
We show that this limitation can be overcome when the cryptosystem is used for
a dynamic feedback controller that guarantees stability of the closed-loop system.
Finally, we illustrate through MATLAB codes how the LWE-based cryptosystem
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can be customized to build a secure feedback control system. This chapter is written
for the control engineers who do not have background on cryptosystems.
1 Introduction
Applications of homomorphic cryptography to the feedback controller are relatively
new. To the authors’ knowledge, the first contribution was made by Kogiso and Fujita
[1] in 2015, followed by Farokhi et al. [2] and Kim et al. [3] both in 2016. Interest-
ingly, each of them uses different homomorphic encryption schemes; El-Gamal [4],
Paillier [5], and LWE [6] are employed, respectively. Because other two schemes
are introduced in other chapters in this book, this chapter is written for introducing
the LWE-based cryptosystem and its customization for building a dynamic feedback
controller.
Homomorphic encryption implies a cryptographic scheme in which arithmetic
operations can be performed directly on the encrypted data (i.e., ciphertexts) without
decrypting them. When applied to the control systems, security increases because
there is no need to keep the secret key inside the controller (see Fig. 1), which is sup-
posed to be a vulnerable point in the feedback loop. After the idea of homomorphic
encryption appeared in 1978 by Rivest el al. [7], two semi-homomorphic encryp-
tion schemes were developed. One is the multiplicatively homomorphic scheme
by El-Gamal [4] developed in 1985, and the other is the additively homomorphic
scheme by Paillier [5] developed in 1999. Homomorphic encryption schemes that
allow both addition and multiplication appeared around 2000, and they are called
somewhat-homomorphic because, even if both arithmetics are enabled, the arith-
metic operations can be performed only finite times on an encrypted variable. In
2009, Gentry [6] developed an algorithm called ‘bootstrapping’ which finally over-
came the restriction of finite number of operations. By performing the bootstrapping
regularly on the encrypted variable, the variable becomes like a newborn ciphertext
and so it allows more operations on it. The encryption scheme with this algorithm
is called fully homomorphic. However, fully homomorphic encryption sometimes
simply implies a scheme that allows both addition and multiplication, and we follow
this convention.
In this chapter, we introduce the LWE-based fully homomorphic encryption
scheme. We illustrate that, if the scheme is used with a stable closed-loop system
then, interestingly, there is no need to employ the bootstrapping for infinite number
of arithmetic operations as long as the system matrix of the controller consists of
integer numbers, and the actuator and the sensor sacrifice their resolutions a little bit.1
Moreover, by utilizing the fully homomorphic arithmetics, we are able to encrypt all
the parameters in the controller, as seen in Fig. 1.
1 If one needs to use the bootstrapping because his/her application does not satisfies these conditions,
then he/she may refer to [3] in which a method to orchestrate the bootstrapping and the dynamic
feedback controller has been presented.
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Fig. 1 The control system configuration considered in this chapter. Note that the secret key sk is
kept only in the plant side, and there is no need to store sk beyond the network. The parameters of
the controllers (such as F, G, H, and J, as well as the initial condition x[0]) are also encrypted. In
this chapter, bold fonts imply encrypted variables.
This chapter consists of three parts. In the first part (Section 2), we present an
introduction to the LWE-based encryption, discuss the homomorphic arithmetics,
and illustrate the error growth in the ciphertexts. The second part (Section 3) is
about customization of the LWE-based cryptosystem for the linear time-invariant
dynamic feedback controllers. In the last part (Section 4), we show the error growth
can be handled by the stability, so that the dynamic controller operates seamlessly
with unlimited times fully homomorphic arithmetics. In Section 5, we conclude the
chapter with a discussion on the need for integer system matrix of the controller,
which is related to one of future research issues. For pedagogical purposes, we
simplify many issues that should be considered in practice, and instead, focus on
the key ingredients of homomorphic encryptions. In the same respect, the codes
presented in this chapter consist of simple MATLAB commands that may not be
used in real applications even if it works for simple examples.
2 Cryptosystem based on Learning-with-Errors Problem
We first present how to encrypt and decrypt a message, in order for the reader to
look and feel the ciphertexts in the LWE-based cryptosystem. Then, we briefly intro-
duce the learning-with-errors (LWE) problem because the security of the presented
cryptosystem is based on the hardness of this problem. We also explain how the
homomorphic arithmetics are performed in the LWE-based cryptosystem.
Now, with p ∈ N, let the set of integers bounded by p/2 be denoted by
[p] :=
{
i ∈ Z : − p
2
≤ i < p
2
}
(1)
so that the cardinality of [p] is p. In addition, we need the following set.
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Set of integers modulo q
Let Zq be the set of integers modulo2 q ∈ N. This means that any two integers a and
b are regarded as the same elements of Zq if (a− b) mod q = 0.3 By this rule, all the
integers are related with other integers that have the same remainder when divided
by q, and thus, [q] can represent Zq if any integer a ∈ Zq is treated as b ∈ [q] such
that (a − b) mod q = 0. In this sense, Zq is closed under addition, subtraction, and
multiplication.
2.1 LWE-based Cryptosystem
Let the set [p] be where the integer to be encrypted belongs to, and let us denote it
by P and call it by the plaintext space. An element m ∈ P is called a message or a
plaintext. The value of p can be chosen as a power of 10 such that |m| < p/2 for all
messages to be used. Now, let Zq be a set of integers modulo q where q = Lpwith L
being a power of 10. Finally, in order to encrypt and decrypt a message m, choose a
secret key sk which is an integer vector of size N such that sk ∈ ZNq . These L and N
are the parameters of the LWE-based cryptosystem and their selection is discussed
in more detail in Section 2.1.2.
Now, let us encrypt a column vector m ∈ P = [p]n having n elements in [p].
Whenever a newmessagem is encrypted, a new randommatrix A ∈ Zn×Nq is sampled
from the uniform distribution over Zn×Nq , and a new vector e ∈ [r]n is randomly
sampled where r < L, so that each component ei satisfies that |ei | < L/2 for
i = 1, · · · , n. With them, compute
b← (−A · sk + Lm + e) mod q (2)
where · is the standard multiplication of a matrix and a vector. Then, the ciphertextm
of the plaintext vector m is obtained by the matrixm = [b,A] ∈ C = Zn×(N+1)q where
C is called the ciphertext space. Define the secret key vector s := [1, skT ]T and let
d·c be the rounding operation for vectors.4 Then, the ciphertext m is decrypted as⌈ (m · s) mod q
L
⌋
=
⌈
Lm + e
L
⌋
→ m (3)
2 In this chapter, all the modulus are chosen as powers of 10 for convenience of understanding while
they are often powers of 2 in practice.
3 x mod q is the remainder after division of x by q. In this chapter, we suppose the remainder is an
element of [q]; for example, if the remainder is greater than or equal to q/2, make it negative by
subtracting q, e.g., 17 mod 10 = −3 ∈ [10].
4 We round away from zero for negative numbers, e.g., d−2.5c = −3 while d−2.4c = −2. When a
is a vector, dac implies component-wise rounding.
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because the size of each element of e is less than L/2. One of the key ingredients
in the LWE-based scheme is the vector e, which is intentionally injected in the
ciphertext by (2) (and is eliminated by the decryption (3)). This vector is called
“error,” and it will be seen in Section 2.1.1 that this error makes this encryption
scheme secure.
The discussions so far yield the MATLAB codes with an example parameter set
env.p = 1e4; env.L = 1e4; env.r = 1e1; env.N = 4;
which are put in a structure variable env. We randomly select a secret key by56
sk = Mod(randi(env.q*env.L,[env.N, 1]), env.q*env.L);
Under these parameters, the codes are as follows.
Functions Enc, Dec
function ciphertext = Enc(m,sk,env)
n = length(m); q = env.L*env.p;
A = randi(q, [n, env.N]);
e = Mod(randi(env.r, [n,1]), env.r);
b = -A*sk + env.L*m + e;
ciphertext = Mod([b,A], q);
end
function plaintext = Dec(c,sk,env)
s = [1; sk];
plaintext = round( Mod(c*s, env.L*env.p)/env.L );
end
An example run shows encryption and decryption of a number 30:
sk =
-13203881
-22462885
-28840424
4713455
5 Since the mod function in MATLAB always returns non-negative remainders, we use our cus-
tomized function (starting with the capital M)
function y = Mod(x,p), y = mod(x,p); y = y - (y >= p/2)*p; end
in order to have signed results in the set like (1).
6 In order to run the codes in this chapter, please choose small numbers for the secret key in order not
to cause the overflow of the double variable in MATLAB. An example is to replace env.q*env.L
by 10 for example.
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c = Enc(30,sk,env)
c =
-43264645 21696438 -15923263 46660236 20129426
m = Dec(c,sk,env)
m =
30
It is seen from the outcome that themessage 30L is hiding in the number−A·sk+e
that is the first element of m.
2.1.1 Necessity of error injection and the learning-with-errors problem
Ameasure for the security of a cryptosystem is how hard it is to find the secret key sk
when arbitrarily many pairs (mi,mi) are given. In fact, the ciphertexts mi are easily
available to the adversary by eavesdropping the communication line, and there are
many cases that the plaintexts mi are also obtainable. (For example, one may guess
an email begins with the word “Dear” even if it is encrypted.) When the pair mi and
mi = [bi,Ai] is available, the adversary can easily obtain (−Ai · sk + e) as well as Ai
by subtracting Lmi from bi (see (2)). Hence, if there is no error injection of e, then
the problem of searching sk simply becomes solving a linear equation in ZNq , which
is not difficult.
Interestingly, with the error e injected, it was proved that solving (or, ‘learning’)
sk becomes extremely difficult. This problem is called ‘learning-with-error (LWE)’
problem, which has been introduced in [8]. For example, with s¯ = [s1, s2, . . . , s4]T =
[3,−5, 1, 0]T ∈ Z4100, consider a sequence of linear equations with errors:
32s1 + 17s2 − 5s3 + 8s4 + e1 = 6 + e1 = 7 (mod 100)
−6s1 + 17s2 + 1s3 + 18s4 + e2 = −2 + e2 = −3 (mod 100)
44s1 + 32s2 + 12s3 + 28s4 + e3 = −16 + e3 = −15 (mod 100)
...
With the error (which need not be large; just a small error is enough, e.g., the error
of 1,−1, 1, · · · is used in the above example), finding s¯ (and ei as well) in the set Z4100
becomers harder (and it becomes very difficult when the dimension gets higher).
In fact, this problem is known to be as hard as the worst-case “lattice problem” so
that the cryptosystem based on it becomes secure at the same level of difficulty to
solve the problem. Actually, the cryptosystem based on the LWE problem is known
to be as much secure as even the quantum computer takes long time to solve (and
thus, it is known as a post-quantum cryptosystem [9]). This is because the difficulty
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is not based on the factoring problem,7 which has been a basis for many other
cryptosystems.
2.1.2 How to choose parameters for desired level of security?
An encryption scheme is called λ-bit secure, whose meaning is briefly introduced
in this subsection. For this, let us consider a game between an adversary and a
challenger. The rule is that, whenever the adversary submits two messages m1 and
m2 to the challenger, the challenger randomly chooses one of them with equal
probability and returns it back to the adversary after encrypting the chosen message.
Then, the adversary guesses which one of m1 and m2 is encrypted by inspecting the
received ciphertext. If the ratio of the adversary’s correct guess is not meaningfully
greater than 0.5 as the game repeats, then the encryption scheme is said to be
indistinguishable. Let A denote the algorithm that the adversary uses in the game
to guess. Then, the encryption scheme is called λ-bit secure if, for all available
adversary’s algorithm A, it holds that
(Computation complexity of A) ×
(
1
|0.5 − Success probability of A|
)
> 2λ.
Clearly, large λ implies that the adversary needs high computational complexitywhile
the success rate is not very different from 0.5 for all possible attack algorithms.
For the case of the LWE-based cryptosystem used in this chapter, it is rather con-
venient to assess its level of security by using a useful tool, called ‘LWE estimator.’
This tool is implemented using Sage program language and an on-line version is
also available.8 When the parameters p, L, r , and N of the LWE-based cryptosys-
tem is given, the estimator computes expected number of operations to attack the
encryption scheme by various attack algorithms A, and finally returns λ. Below is
an example for using the estimator with a specific parameter set.
load(estimator.py)
p = 1e4; L = 1e4; r = 1e2; N = 20
_ = estimate_lwe(N, (r / (L * p)), (L * p))
The following is the output of the estimator with the parameter set.
usvp: rop: = 2^29.7, ...
dec: rop: = 2^32.3, ...
dual: rop: = 2^31.3, ...
Those values of rop mean the number of operations for each attack called usvp,
dec, and dual. Therefore, we can say that the parameter set has at least 29.7-bit
security. It is known that the security level λ roughly has the following property:
7 Factoring problem is to find large prime numbers p and q when N = pq is given. This problem
is supposed to be easily solved (i.e., in polynomial time) by quantum computers.
8 https://bitbucket.org/malb/lwe-estimator
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N
log q − log r ∝
λ
log λ
.
Therefore, increasing N may easily lead to higher security.
2.2 Homomorphic Property of LWE-based Cryptosystem
As a control engineer, a reason for particular interest on the LWE-based cryptosystem
is that it allows homomorphic arithmetics. By homomorphic arithmetics, we mean,
for two plaintexts m1 and m2, it holds that
Dec
(
Enc(m1) ∗C Enc(m2)
)
= m1 ∗P m2
where ∗P and ∗C are binary operations on the plaintext space P and the ciphertext
space C, respectively, and Dec and Enc symbolize the encryption and the decryption
functions, respectively. The LWE-based cryptosystem provides both the homomor-
phic addition and the homomorphic multiplication.
The addition is defined in the following way:
Enc(m1) +C Enc(m2) = m1 +m2
= [−A1 · sk + Lm1 + e1, A1] + [−A2 · sk + Lm2 + e2, A2]
= [−(A1 + A2) · sk + L(m1 + m2) + (e1 + e2), A1 + A2]
(4)
where+C is the addition on the ciphertext space and+ is the standardmatrix addition.
To see the homomorphic property, observe that
Dec(m1 +m2) =
⌈ (m1 +m2) · s mod q
L
⌋
=
⌈
L(m1 + m2) + e1 + e2
L
⌋
= m1 + m2
(5)
as long as m1 + m2 ∈ [p] and each element of |e1 + e2 | is less than L/2.
Let us now consider the homomorphic multiplication of two scalar plaintexts
m1 ∈ [p] and m2 ∈ [p]. Without loss of generality, let m1 be the multiplicand and m2
be the multiplier for the product m2m1. For the multiplicand m1, we use the previous
encryption functionm1 = Enc(m1) ∈ Z1×(N+1)q but for the multiplier m2, we slightly
change the encryption method910 as
M2 = Enc2(m2) = m2R + Enc(0log q ·(N+1)×1) ∈ Zlog q ·(N+1)×(N+1)q (6)
where 0log q ·(N+1)×1 is the plaintext of zero vector in [p]log q ·(N+1)×1 and, with the
Kronecker product being denoted by ⊗,
9 In practice, parameters d ∈ N and ν ∈ N is chosen such that q = νd , which customizes the
dimension of the ciphertextM2 asM2 ∈ Zd(N+1)×(N+1)q .
10 This encryption was developed in [10] and the idea of using different encryption method for m2
was introduced in [11], which is customized for our context in this chapter.
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R := [100, 101, 102, · · · , 10log q−1]T ⊗ IN+1
where IN+1 is the identity matrix of size N +1, so that R is a matrix of log q · (N +1)
by (N + 1). Note that O := Enc(0log q ·(N+1)×1) is a matrix in Zlog q ·(N+1)×(N+1)q , each
row of which is an encryption of the plaintext 0 (but they are all different due to
the randomness of A and e). This modified encryption Enc2 has the same level of
security as Enc because the plaintext m2 is still hiding in the ciphertext O. Now we
note that any vector c in Z1×(N+1)q can be represented using the radix of 10 as c =∑log q−1
i=0 ci ·10i in which each component of the row vector ci is one of the single digit
0, 1, 2, · · · , 9. Therefore, one can define the function D : Z1×(N+1)q → Z1×log q ·(N+1)q
that decomposes the argument by its string of digits as
D(c) := [c0, c1, · · · , clog q−1] . (7)
An example when q = 102 and N = 2 is:
D ([40, 35,−27]) = D ([40, 35, 73]) = [0, 5, 3, 4, 3, 7]
because [40, 35, 73] = [0, 5, 3]·100+[4, 3, 7]·101. As a result, it follows that c = D(c)R
for any c ∈ Z1×(N+1)q . Now, the multiplication of two ciphertexts m1 = Enc(m1) and
m2 = Enc(m2) can be done by, withM2 = Enc2(Dec(m2)),
M2 ×C m1 := D(m1) ·M2 ∈ Z1×(N+1)q
where · is the standard matrix multiplication. It should be noted that the operation
Enc2(Dec(m2)) requires the secret key sk, and thus, the above operation is more
suitable when the multiplier m2 is encrypted as M2 = Enc2(m2) a priori, and used
repeatedly for different m1’s (which will be the case when we construct dynamic
feedback controllers). In this case, the product of the multiplicand m1 with the
multiplierM2 is simply performed as D(m1) ·M2. To see the homomorphic property,
we first note that, with the secret key s,
(M2 ×C m1) · s = D(m1) ·M2 · s = D(m1) ·
(
m2R +O
) · s
= m2m1 · s + D(m1) · eM2
(8)
where eM2 ∈ Zlog q ·(N+1)×1q is the error vector inside the ciphertext O. From this, we
observe that multiplication byM2 is equivalent to multiplication by the plaintext m2
plus an error. Then, we have the homomorphic property for multiplication as
Dec(M2 ×C m1) =
⌈
D(m1) ·M2 · s mod q
L
⌋
=
⌈
m2(Lm1 + e1) + D(m1) · eM2
L
⌋
= m2m1,
(9)
as long as m2m1 ∈ [p] and
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 < 12 . (10)
A sample run and the codes for two operations are as follows:
q = env.p*env.L;
c1 = Enc(-2,sk,env); c2 = Enc(3,sk,env); c2m = Enc2(3,sk,env);
c_add = c1 + c2;
c_mul = Decomp(c1, q)*c2m;
Dec(c_add,sk,env)
ans =
1
Dec(c_mul,sk,env)
ans =
-6
Functions Enc2, Decomp
function ciphertext = Enc2(m,sk,env)
q = env.L*env.p; N = env.N; lq = log10(q);
R = kron( power(10, [0:1:lq-1]’), eye(N+1) );
ciphertext = Mod(m*R + Enc(zeros(lq*(N+1),1), sk, env), q);
end
function strdigits = Decomp(c, q)
lq = log10(q);
c = mod(c, q);
strdigits = [];
for i=0:lq-1,
Q = c - mod(c, 10^(lq-1-i));
strdigits = [ Q/10^(lq-1-i), strdigits ];
c = c - Q;
end
end
If a ciphertext m1 ∈ Z1×(N+1)q is multiplied with a plaintext m2 ∈ [p], then it
is simply performed by m1m2 (mod q) because this case can be considered as a
repeated homomorphic addition.
Finally, we close this section by presenting a code for obtaining the product of the
ciphertext of a matrix F ∈ [p]m×n and the ciphertext of a column vector x ∈ [p]n that
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is equivalent to the ciphertext of Fx. With Fi, j = Enc2(Fi, j)where Fi, j is the (i, j)-th
element of F, and xj being the j-th row of x = Enc(x), we define the multiplication
as
F ×C x :=
n∑
j=1

D(xj) · F1, j
D(xj) · F2, j
...
D(xj) · Fn, j

in which, we abuse the notation ×C that was defined for a scalar product. Then,
analogously to (8) and (9), it follows that
(F ×C x) · s =
n∑
j=1

D(xj) · F1, j · s
D(xj) · F2, j · s
...
D(xj) · Fn, j · s

=
n∑
j=1

F1, j · xj · s + D(xj) · eF1, j
F2, j · xj · s + D(xj) · eF2, j
...
Fn, j · xj · s + D(xj) · eFn, j

= F · x · s +
n∑
j=1

D(xj) · eF1, j
D(xj) · eF2, j
...
D(xj) · eFn, j

=: F · x · s + ∆(F, x)
(11)
where eFi, j is the error inside Fi, j , and the homomorphic property is obtained as
Dec(F ×C x) =
⌈
1
L
(F · x · s + ∆(F, x) mod q)
⌋
= Fx +
⌈
1
L
(F · ex + ∆(F, x))
⌋
= Fx
as long as Fx ∈ [p]m and the error |F · ex + ∆(F, x)| is less than L/2.
Therefore, the operation
F ×C x +G ×C y
where + is the standard addition, corresponds to the plaintext operation Fx + Gy
with two matrices F and G, and two vectors x and y. An example code and a sample
run are as follows.
F = [1, 2; 3, 4];
cF = Enc2Mat(F,sk,env);
x = [1;2];
cx = Enc(x,sk,env);
cFcx = MatMult(cF,cx,env);
Dec(cFcx,sk,env)
ans =
5
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Functions Enc2Mat, MatMult
function cA = Enc2Mat(A,sk,env)
q = env.p*env.L; N = env.N; [n1,n2] = size(A);
cA = zeros(log10(q)*(N+1), N+1, n1, n2);
for i=1:n1,
for j=1:n2,
cA(:,:,i,j) = Enc2(A(i,j),sk,env);
end
end
end
function Mm = MatMult(M,m,env)
[n1,n2,n3,n4] = size(M); q = env.p*env.L;
Mm = zeros(n3,env.N+1);
for i=1:n3,
for j=1:n4,
Mm(i,:) = ...
Mod(Mm(i,:) + Decomp(m(j,:),env.p*env.L) * M(:,:,i,j), q);
end
end
end
2.2.1 Error growth problem caused by error injection
As can be seen in (2), a newborn scalar ciphertextm has its error ewhose size is less
than r/2; that is, ‖e‖∞ ≤ r/2 where ‖ · ‖∞ is the infinity norm of a vector. However,
the size of the error inside a ciphertext can grow as the arithmetic operations are
performed on the variable. For example, if MaxError(m) measures the maximum
size of the worst-case error in m, then MaxError(m1 + m2) = MaxError(m1) +
MaxError(m2) and MaxError(m1m2) = m2MaxError(m1) for a plaintext m2, which
can be seen from (4). The multiplication may cause more increase of the error as can
be seen in (10). That is, the error in the productmprod of the multiplicandm1 and the
multiplier M2 leads to MaxError(mprod) = m2MaxError(m1) + 9(r/2) log q because
each element of eM2 is the error of the newborn ciphertext so that its absolute value
is less than r/2 and the component of D(m1) ranges from 0 to 9. It is noted that the
first term m2MaxError(m1) is natural, but the amount of the second term may always
add whenever the multiplication is performed.
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The discussions so far show that, if the arithmetic operations are performed many
times on the ciphertext, then the error may grow unbounded in the worst case, and it
may damage the message in the ciphertext. Damage of the message happens when
the size of the error in the ciphertext becomes larger than L/2. Indeed, the following
example shows this phenomenon:
c = Enc(1,sk,env);
Dec(3*c,sk,env)
ans =
3
Dec(3000*c,sk,env)
ans =
2999
The error growth problem restricts the number of consecutive arithmetic operation
on the ciphertext. In order to overcome the restriction, the blueprint of ‘bootstrap-
ping’ procedure has been developed in [6]. In a nutshell, the grown-up error can be
eliminated if the ciphertext is once decrypted and encrypted back again. The boot-
strapping algorithm reduces the size of error by performing this process without the
knowledge of the secret key. However, the complexity of the bootstrapping process
hinders from being used for dynamic feedback controls.We discuss how to overcome
this problem without bootstrapping in Section 4.
3 LWE-based Cryptosystem and Dynamic Feedback Controller
For a comprehensive discussion with dynamic controllers, let us consider a discrete-
time single-input-single-output linear time-invariant plant:
xp[t + 1] = Axp[t] + Bu[t], y[t] = Cxp[t]. (12)
To control the plant (12), we suppose that a discrete-time linear time-invariant
dynamic feedback controller has been designed as
x[t + 1] = Fx[t] + Gy[t] (13a)
u[t] = Hx[t] + Jy[t] (13b)
where x ∈ Rn is the state of the controller, y ∈ R is the controller input, and u ∈ R
is the controller output. Note that they are real numbers in general, and not yet
quantized. In order to implement the controller by a digital computer, we need to
quantize the signals y, u, and x, and to use the cryptosystem for the controller, we
also need to make them integer values. This procedure is called ‘quantization’ in this
chapter.
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Quantization is performed both on the sensor signal y[t], on the control pa-
rameters, and finally on the actuator signal u[t]. The quantization level for y[t] is
often determined by the specification of the sensor under the name of resolution Ry .
Therefore, we define the quantized integer value of the signal y[t] as
y[t] −→ y¯[t] :=
⌈
y[t]
Ry
⌋
. (14)
For example, with Ry = 0.1, the signal y[t] = 12.11 becomes y¯[t] = 121. This
procedure is performed at the sensor stage before the encryption. On the other hand,
the matrices in (13) are composed of real numbers in general. These numbers should
be truncated for digital implementation, but it is often the case when the significant
digits of them include fractional parts. In this case, we can “scale” the controller
(13) by taking advantages of the linear system. Before discussing the scaling, we
assume that the matrix F consists of integer numbers so that the scaling for F is not
necessary. This is an important restriction and we will discuss this issue in detail in
Section 5. Now, takeG = [5.19, 38]T for example. If those numbers are to be kept up
to the fraction 1/10 =: SG , then the quantized G can be defined as G¯ := dG/SGc so
that G¯ = [52, 380]T . By dividing (13a) by RySG , we obtain the quantized equation
as
x[t + 1]
SGRy
= F
x[t]
SGRy
+
G
SG
y[t]
Ry
truncation−−−−−−−→ x¯[t + 1] = Fx¯[t] + G¯ y¯[t]
where x¯[t] := x[t]/(SGRy)which becomes integer for all t > 0 if the initial condition
is set as x¯[0] = dx[0]/(SGRy)c. Since there may be still some significant fractional
numbers in the matrices H or J/SG in general, the output equation (13b) is scaled
with additional scaling factor SHJ as
u[t]
SHJSGRy
=
H
SHJ
x[t]
SGRy
+
J
SHJSG
y[t]
Ry
truncation−−−−−−−→ u¯[t] = H¯ x¯[t] + J¯ y¯[t],
where H¯ := dH/SHJ c, J¯ := dJ/(SHJSG)c, and u¯[t] := u[t]/(SHJSGRy). Therefore,
the quantized controller
x¯[t + 1] = Fx¯[t] + G¯ y¯[t] (15a)
u¯[t] = H¯ x¯[t] + J¯ y¯[t] (15b)
is composed of integer values, and the state x¯[t] evolves on the integer state-space.
Finally, the real number input u[t] is obtained by
u¯[t] −→ u[t] = Ru
⌈
RySGSHJ
Ru
u¯[t]
⌋
(16)
at the actuator stage, where Ru is the resolution of the actuator. If RySGSHJ/Ru
is an integer then the rounding doesn’t work because u¯[t] is integer. It is clear that
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the digital implementation of (13), given by (14), (15), and (16), works well if the
truncation error is small.
Since the quantized controller (15) consists of all the integer matrices and vectors,
it is straightforward to convert it to the homomorphically encrypted controller
x[t + 1] = F ×C x[t] +G ×C y[t] (17a)
u[t] = H ×C x[t] + J ×C y[t] (17b)
where the operations on the ciphertexts should be understood as explained in Section
2.2. Note that y[t] = Enc(y[t]) is always a newborn ciphertext for each t because it
is encrypted and transmitted from the sensor stage. Moreover, the ciphertexts F, G,
H, and J can be considered as all newborn ciphertexts because they are generated
when the controller is set and not updated by the control operation. The equation
(17) is solved at each time step with the initial condition x[0] = Enc(x¯[0]). Under
this setting, two new ciphertexts x[t + 1] and u[t] are created at each time step, or
the system (17) is considered to be driven by y[t] with x[0]. The vector x[0] also has
the newborn error, but the error in x[t] may grow as time goes on because of the
recursion in (17a).
As an example, consider a first-order plant given by xp[t + 1] =
√
2xp[t] + u[t]
and y[t] = xp[t], for which a first-order dynamic feedback controller x[t + 1] =
−1 · x[t]+1 · y[t] and u[t] = −1.414 · x[t]+0 · y[t] stabilizes the closed-loop system.
With the parameters Ry = 10−3, SG = 1, SHJ = 10−3, and Ru = RySGSHJ = 10−6
the simulation can be done for timesteps = 150 as follows.11
A = sqrt(2); B = 1; C = 1; % plant
F = -1; G = 1; H = -1.414; J = 0; % controller
Ry = 1e-3; Sg = 1e0; Shj = 1e-3;
G_ = round(G/Sg); H_ = round(H/Shj); J_ = round(J/(Sg*Shj));
cFG = Enc2Mat([F,G_],sk,env); cHJ = Enc2Mat([H_,J_],sk,env);
xp = -3.4; x = 4.3; % i.c. of plant and ctr
cx = Enc(round(x/(Ry*Sg)), sk, env);
for i = 1:timesteps
y = C*xp; % Plant output
cy = Enc(round(y/Ry), sk, env); % Encryption
cu = MatMult(cHJ, [cx;cy], env); % Controller output
u = Ry*Sg*Shj*Dec(cu, sk, env); % Plant input after Dec
xp = A*xp + B*u; % Plant update
cx = MatMult(cFG, [cx;cy], env); % Controller update
end
11 An example parameter set for this example is env.p = 1e9, env.L = 100, and env.r = 10.
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4 Controlled Error Growth by Closed-loop Stability
As mentioned previously, the growth of the error in the ciphertext x[t] is of major
concern in this section. We have to suppress its growth not to go unbounded.
Actually, the source of error growth is the arithmetic operations in (17). To see
both the message and the error in the state x[t], let us decrypt the dynamics (17) with
the secret key s except the rounding operation; i.e., we define
ξ[t] := (x[t] · s) mod q
L
∈ Rn
so thatDec(x[t]) = dξ[t]c, and see the evolution of ξ-system over real-valued signals,
which in turn is equivalent to the operation of (17). According to the homomorphic
property (11), the ξ-system is derived as
ξ[t + 1] = Fξ[t] + G¯
(
y¯[t] + ey[t]
L
)
+
∆(F, x[t])
L
+
∆(G, y[t])
L
=: Fξ[t] + G¯ y¯[t] + ∆1[t], ξ[0] = x¯[0] +
ex[0]
L
,
u¯′[t] = H¯ξ[t] + J¯
(
y¯[t] + ey[t]
L
)
+
∆(H, x[t])
L
+
∆(J, y[t])
L
=: H¯ξ[t] + J¯ y¯[t] + ∆2[t],
(18)
in which ey[t] and ex[0] are the errors injected to the encryptions y[t] and x[0],
respectively, ∆(F, x[t]), ∆(G, y[t]), ∆(H, x[t]), and ∆(J, y[t]) are the errors caused
by ciphertext multiplication, which are defined as the same as in (11), and u¯′[t] is
defined as u¯′[t] := (u[t] · s mod q)/L so that Dec(u[t]) = du¯′[t]c.
For the comparison with the quantized controller (15), the first observation is that
if there is no error injected to ciphertexts y[t], x[0], and {F,G,H, J} so that ∆1[t],
∆2[t], and ex[0] are all zero, the operation of (18) is exactly the same way as the
operation of (15). Then, with the control perspective, the signals ∆1[t] and ∆2[t]
can be understood as external disturbances injected to the feedback loop, and the
quantity ex[0] can be regarded as perturbation of the initial condition (see Fig. 2).
Here, the sizes of ∆1[t], ∆2[t], and ex[0] can be made arbitrarily small by increasing
the parameter L for the encryption. This is because ‖ey[t]/L‖∞ and ‖ex[0]/L‖∞ are
less than r/(2L), and the disturbance caused by multiplication of {x[t], y[t]} by
{F,G,H, J} can also be made arbitrary small with the choice of L; for example, as
seen in (11), the size of signal ∆(F, x[t])/L is bounded as
∆(F, x[t])L ∞ ≤ 1L
n∑
j=1


D(xj[t]) · eF1, j
D(xj[t]) · eF2, j
...
D(xj[t]) · eFn, j


∞
≤ 9nr log q
2L
=
9nr(log p + log L)
2L
.
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Fig. 2 This figure describes the closed-loop system with the controller (18). In other words, the
behavior of the closed-loop system with the encrypted controller (17) is the behavior of the closed-
loop with the quantized controller (15) with the norm-bounded external disturbances ∆1[t] and
∆2[t], and the perturbation ex[0]/L on the initial condition of the controller.
Now, in terms of the error growth problem of the controller state, the difference
ξ[t] − x¯[t] corresponds to the error of our concern. One might expect that the size
of ξ[t] − x¯[t] can be made arbitrarily small by increasing L, but it is not true due
to the rounding operations in the sensor and actuator; for example, if the difference
ξ[t] − x¯[t] is so small that the difference of actuator inputs is less than the size of
input resolution, it is truncated and the difference is not compensated in the closed-
loop stability. As a result, the error eventually grows up to the resolution range, but
is controlled not to grow more than that. Therefore, the damage of the message in
the ciphertexts x[t] is inevitable, but it can be limited up to the last a few digits.
Motivated by this fact, one may intentionally enhance the resolutions by a few more
digits in order to preserve the significant figures. In this way, as long as the injected
errors ∆1[t], ∆2[t], and ex[0]/L are sufficiently small, the error (i.e., the difference
ξ[t] − x¯[t]) is controlled not to grow unbounded by the closed-loop stability. See a
simulation result in Fig. 3.
In the rest of this section, we analyze the control performance in terms of the
encryption as well as the quantization. The detailed quantitative analysis is omitted
but can be found in [12]. For this, let us recall that Dec(u[t]) = du¯′[t]c. This leads
to, by (16),
u = Ru
⌈
RySGSHJ
Ru
du¯′c
⌋
= RySGSHJ u¯′ + ∆Dec + ∆u
where
∆Dec := RySGSHJ (du¯′c − u¯′) , ∆u := Ru
⌈
RySGSHJ
Ru
du¯′c
⌋
− RySGSHJ du¯′c
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Fig. 3 The error in the ciphertext x[t] from a sample run of the simulation in Section 3. This is
the plot of L(ξ[t] − x¯[t]) where x¯[t] is the state of the quantized controller and ξ[t] is the state
of (18), with the parameters L = 100, 1/RySG = 1000, and r = 10. It is seen that the error goes
beyond L, but is suppressed within one digit in the resolution range. This means that the message
is damaged but only for one last digit.
in which, ∆Dec implies the error caused by the rounding in the decryption, and
∆u implies the error by the quantization of the input stage. Now, for the sake of
simplicity, let us assume thatG = SGG¯, H = SHJ H¯, and J = SHJSG J¯, which means
there is no error due to the scaling of the matrices. By defining ξ ′ := RySGξ, we
obtain from (18) that
RySGSHJ u¯′ = Hξ ′ + Jy + J∆y + RySGSHJ∆2 where ∆y := Ry
⌈
y
Ry
⌋
− y
in which, ∆y is the error caused by the quantization at the sensor stage. Putting to-
gether, the closed-loop system of the plant (12) and the controller (18) is equivalently
described by
xp[t + 1] = Axp[t] + B(Hξ ′[t] + JCxp[t])
+
{
B(J∆y[t] + RySGSHJ∆2[t] + ∆Dec[t] + ∆u[t])
}
ξ ′[t + 1] = Fξ ′[t] + GCxp[t] +
{
G∆y[t] + SGSHJ∆1[t]
}
with the initial condition of the controller is set to be
ξ ′[0] = x[0] +
{
RySG
⌈
x[0]
RySG
⌋
− x[0] + RySGex[0]
L
}
where x[0] is the initial condition of (13). Note that all the braced terms (i.e., errors)
can be made arbitrarily small with sufficiently small Ry and Ru and with sufficiently
large L. Moreover, with all these errors being zero, the above system is nothing but
the closed-loop system of the plant (12) and the controller (13), which is supposed
to be asymptotically stable. Therefore, it is seen that the control performance with
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the encrypted controller (17) can be made arbitrarily close to the nominal control
performance with the linear controller (13).
5 Conclusion and Need for Integer System Matrix
In this chapter, with the use of fully homomorphic encryption, we have seen a
method aswell as an illustrative example to implement a dynamic feedback controller
over encrypted data. Exploiting both additively and multiplicatively homomorphic
properties of LWE-based scheme, all the operations in the controller are performed
over encrypted parameters and signals. Once the designed controller (13) is converted
to the dynamical system (15) over integer, it can be directly encrypted as (17).
From the nature of fully homomorphic encryption schemes, the error injected to the
encryption y[t] may be accumulated in the controller state x[t] under the recursive
state update and may affect the message. However, from the control perspective, it
has been seen that the effect of error is controlled and suppressed by the stability of
the closed-loop system.
For the concluding remark, let us revisit that the encryption scheme for the
dynamic controller (13) is based on the assumption that all entries of the system
matrix F are integers. To see the necessity of this assumption, let us suppose the
matrix F consists of non-integer real numbers. One may attempt the scaling of F as
dF/SF c with the scaling factor 1/SF > 1 in order to keep the fractional part of F,
but this scaling is hopeless because it results in recursive multiplication by 1/SF for
each update of the controller. Indeed, for this case, it can be checked that the state
x¯[t] of the quantized controller (15a) is multiplied by dF/SF c (instead of F) for each
time step, so (15a) should be remodeled as the form
x¯[t + 1] =
⌈
F
SF
⌋
x¯[t] +
⌈
G
St+1F SG
⌋
y¯[t] (19)
with the relation x¯[t] = x[t]/(StFSGRy). However, encryption of (19) is hopeless,
because in this case the message of the encrypted state is unbounded due to the
term 1/StF . It will lose its value when it eventually go beyond the bound ±p/2 of
the plaintext space [p] represented as (1), unless the state is reset to eliminate the
accumulated scaling factor.
This problem, which is from the constraint that encrypted variables can be multi-
plied by scaled real numbers only a finite number of times, is in fact one of the main
difficulties of encrypting dynamic controllers having non-integer systemmatrix12. In
this respect, one may find potential benefits of using proportional-integral-derivative
(PID) controllers or finite-impulse-response (FIR) filters for the design of encrypted
12 The problem is the same for encrypted controllers based on additively homomorphic encryption
schemes. See [13] for the details.
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control system, because they can be realized with the matrix F being integer as
follows:
• Given an FIR filter written as C(z) = ∑ni=0 bn−iz−i , and the dynamic feedback
controller can be realized as
x[t + 1] =

0 · · · 0 0
1 · · · 0 0
...
. . .
...
...
0 · · · 1 0

x[t] +

1
0
...
0

y[t], u[t] = [bn−1 · · · b1 b0] x[t] + bny[t].
• A discrete PID controller in the parallel form is given by
C(z) = kp + kiTsz − 1 +
kd
Ts
Nd
+
Ts
z−1
where kp , ki , and kd are the proportional, integral, and derivative gains, respec-
tively, Ts is the sampling time, and Nd ∈ N is the parameter for the derivative
filter. This controller can be realized as
x[t + 1] =
[
2 − Nd Nd − 1
1 0
]
x[t] +
[
1
0
]
y[t], u[t] = [b1 b0] x[t] + b2y[t]
where b1 = kiTs − kdN2d/Ts , b0 = kiTsNd − kiTs + kdN2d/Ts , and b2 = kp +
kdNd/Ts .
Another idea of approximating the effect of non-integer real numbers of F has
been presented in [13] by using stable pole-zero cancellation. However, it was done
at the cost of increased steady-state error in control performance. Further research is
called for in this direction.
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